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Abstract This article reports results of an experiment designed to analyze the link
between risky decisions made by couples and risky decisions made separately by each
spouse. We estimate both the spouses and the couples’ degrees of risk aversion, we
assess how the risk preferences of the two spouses aggregate when they make risky
decisions, and we shed light on the dynamics of the decision process that takes place
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when couples make risky decisions. We find that, far from being fixed, the balance of
power within the household is malleable. In most couples, men have, initially, more
decision-making power than women but women who ultimately implement the joint
decisions gain more and more power over the course of decision making.
Keywords Balance of power · Experiments · Household decision-making · Risk
1 Introduction
Almost every important economic decision involves risk, and a substantial body of
research investigates how individuals incorporate risk into their decision process. In
this body of literature, only a tiny portion is devoted to the study of household deci-
sion-making under risk. However, in many day-to-day life contexts such as financial
investments, insurance, retirement plans, or residential location, the decisions have
consequences at the household level rather than at the individual level. These deci-
sions are (or should be) made jointly. Even when these decisions are formally made
by only one member of the household, they may modify (and/or can be modified by)
other decisions in the household.
A growing literature in economics shows that household savings and financial
investments are significantly affected by how decision-making power is allocated
between men and women.1 This empirical work observes household outcomes and
changes in members’ incomes to draw conclusions about underlying gender prefer-
ences. As argued below, we strongly believe that this evidence should be interpreted
with caution and that such empirical results are not necessarily reflective of intrinsic
or immutable preference differences between women and men. In order to identify the
link between risky decisions made by couples and risky decisions made separately by
each spouse, we use an experimental approach. We observe intra-household financial
decisions in an artifactual field experiment.2 Our experiment was explicitly designed to
investigate the decision process that takes place when couples make risky decisions.3
Until recently, household decisions were treated in the standard neoclassical frame-
work of economic theory. This approach corresponds to the unitary model, which
1 For example, income given to women is more likely to be used for investments in education and housing
than income given to men (Duflo 2003).
2 An artifactual field experiment is identical to a typical laboratory experiment but one which makes use
of a non-standard subject pool (see the terminology of Harrison and List 2004).
3 Though there exists copious experimental evidence on how individuals choose, there has been very little
experimental investigation into how households or couples make their decisions. Bateman and Munro (2005)
present results of an experiment designed to investigate the extent to which decisions made by couples and
decisions made separately by spouses are consistent with the axioms of Expected Utility Theory (EUT).
They find that choices made by couples exhibit the same kinds of patterns (e.g., the common ratio and com-
mon consequence effects) as are regularly recorded with individuals. Bateman and Munro (2009) report
on a choice experiment using reductions in dietary health risks as the vehicle. In one treatment, a random
individual is chosen from the couple and takes part in a face-to-face interview; in the other treatment, both
partners are asked questions jointly, again in a face-to-face interview. They find significant differences in
the values elicited in the two treatments, and the values elicited from couples are not a simple average of
those elicited from men and women.
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involves a unique decision-maker representing the household. From a methodological
point of view, unitary models are open to criticism, since they hide the divergences of
interest that may arise among household members. Unitary models implicitly assume
that the household’s members pursue consensual objectives. However, individual pref-
erences cannot be easily aggregated. As pointed out by Chiappori (1988), joint decision
making has a different meaning within a couple than in other contexts such as pro-
fessional interactions. A poor understanding of decision mechanisms (and therefore,
of resources allocation within the household) may introduce biases at the descriptive
level (interpretation of empirical results) and at the normative level (optimal taxa-
tion of households). Further emphasis on the bargaining process in which men and
women interact can shed greater light on how individual incomes turn into household
outcomes.
The main differences between couples (or more generally families) and other groups
are that (i) a large degree of altruism usually takes place within the couple, and (ii)
spouses usually have more occasions and willingness to share information. In riskless
situations, Chiappori (1988) assumes that the utility of a family is a weighted average
of the utilities of its members; the (endogenous) weights depend on all individual
characteristics and reflect the respective bargaining powers of each member in the
household. Chiappori’s approach amounts to assume that the negotiation leads to a
Pareto-optimal solution, which is consistent with any efficient negotiation process. The
weights of each spouse’s utility are then called Pareto weights. If the Pareto weights
are constant (i.e., do not depend on any individual or family characteristics such as
wages or individual wealths), then the family can be represented by a single standard
utility function. This corresponds to the (above mentioned) unitary approach, which
ignores the various decision-making processes and transactions occurring among the
household members. Unitary models imply the income pooling condition: decisions
made by the family should not be affected by the source of income or wealth.
On the contrary, if the Pareto weights are not constant, then bargaining powers
change with individual wages or wealths. In this case, there is no simple and intui-
tive relation between the spouses’ and the couple risk aversions. Income pooling has
been repeatedly rejected empirically in different cultural contexts (Vermeulen 2002).
Therefore, more and more studies (both theoretical and empirical) concerned with
couple decisions in a deterministic environment are now written within the collective
framework (a` la Chiappori).
When risk dimensions are involved in the decision process, most of the literature
still relies on the unitary approach. Among the very few exceptions is Mazzocco (2004)
who shows that, in a collective model, an increase in the degree of risk aversion of
one household member may induce the household to take more risk (see also Donni
2003). This counter-intuitive phenomenon results from the opposing impacts of indi-
vidual degrees of risk aversion on individual decisions and Pareto weights. Indeed, the
Households Retirement Survey data show that the risk aversion of couples in which
the woman’s risk aversion is very high, and is a U—shaped function of the man’s risk
aversion.
This article reports on an experimental test of couple decision-making under risk.
Couples are presented with tasks involving binary choices between a lottery and a sure
payoff. In the first part of the experiment, spouses are separated and choose indepen-
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dently. In the second part of the experiment, male spouses rejoin their partner and they
make joint decisions. Couples are video-recorded while interacting and discussing
to make joint decisions. We estimate both the spouses and the couples’ degrees of
risk aversion, we assess how the risk preferences of the two spouses aggregate when
they make risky decisions, and we shed light on the dynamics of the decision pro-
cess that takes place when couples make risky decisions. We find that, far from being
fixed, the balance of power within the household is malleable. In most couples, men
have, initially, more decision-making power than women but women who ultimately
implement the joint decisions gain more and more power over the course of decision
making.
The road map of the article is as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental
design. In Sect. 3, we first provide ordinal measures of couples and spouses risk aver-
sion, and then we investigate the dynamics of power balance using discrete choice
models techniques. A quantitative analysis of the couples discussions is provided in
Sect. 4. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes.
2 Experimental design
We elicited measures of risk aversion by means of choice bracketing procedures, also
referred to as investment series. In each step of the bracketing procedure, the decision
maker (either an individual or a couple) had to choose between a safe and a risky
alternative. Risky alternatives were simple monetary lotteries, modeling the toss of a
fair coin, i.e., yielding a low (respectively high) payoff with probability 1/2. Potential
payoffs and probabilities were always known to the decision makers and, in a given
bracketing procedure, the safe alternative was a sure amount ranging from the low
outcome of the lottery to the high outcome of the lottery. At the end of the experi-
mental session, one of the steps was randomly selected for payoff, and the decision
maker’s chosen option was then played out as the reward.4 All details concerning the
bracketing procedures and the lotteries are to be found in the Supplementary Material.5
Our elicitation method has two main advantages: First, we expect it to provide reli-
able estimates of risk aversion due to the simplicity of the task and the transparency
of the incentives to respond truthfully; Second, it enables us to directly infer a risk
attitude from the pattern of the decision maker’s responses in a given investment series
(see Sect. 3.1). The main disadvantage of our elicitation instrument is that it cannot
be used to make inferences about non-EUT models of choice behavior. As we restrict
probabilities to 1/2, we cannot use the decision maker’s responses to make inferences
4 The random lottery incentive system avoids income and house money effects, and it has become the
almost exclusively used incentive system in individual decision-making experimental studies today. Holt
(1986) argued that if subjects do not separate each task under this incentive system, then it would lead them
to a different behavior from that in a single-shot task. However, several experimental studies demonstrate
that the random lottery incentive system induces an almost identical behavior to that in a single-shot task
(Starmer and Sugden 1991; Cubitt et al. 1998; Hey and Lee 2005).
5 Our elicitation method is remotely related to the Random Lottery Pairs design which has been generally
used to test the predictions of EUT (see, among others, Hey and Orme 1994). The main differences are that
probabilities were always equal to 1/2 in our design, and one of the two alternatives was a safe option.
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about probability weighting, which plays a major role in rank-dependent alternatives
to EUT. Consequently, we default to thinking of risk attitudes as synonymous with the
properties of the utility function, consistent with traditional EUT representations.
2.1 Experimental sessions and participants
Seven experimental sessions were carried out from January 2005 to February 2005.
Subjects were recruited from the city of Jena (Germany) via local newspaper
advertisements, through community groups, and using posters in the city center. Ses-
sion sizes varied from 2 to 4 couples, and were held at the experimental economics
video laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena. In recruiting, we
required all individuals to be over 30, to be living with their partners and to have been
together as a couple for at least one year. We recruited 22 couples for our experiment.
They answered to a total of 3,828 lotteries (either individually or with their spouse).
At the beginning of the experiment, we asked a few warm-up questions to the spouses
separately about themselves and about the couple (see step 1 of Sect. 1 in the exper-
imental procedures sum-up below). The main characteristics are briefly summarized
now.
Average payoffs were just above 50e per individual—more than five times the
median hourly post-tax wage for an adult working in the former East Germany in
2005. Ages ranged from 21 to 64, with a mean of 43.6 Approximately 73% of individ-
uals stated that they were married to their current partner, and all the couples in our
sample were heterosexual. On average, couples had been together for 15 years (median
of 17), with a maximum of 42 and a minimum of less than 1.7 Interestingly, the union
duration stated by women is on average 1 year more than the duration stated by men,
with a maximum difference of 12 years. This difference may be explained by the fact
that the man only considered marriage duration, whereas the woman considered the
total duration, including the period they were living together before they got married.
On average, couples had 1.3 children together. In addition, the women (men) had on
average 0.3 (respectively 0.5) children from previous union(s). These figures are quite
representative of the German population (see Lechner 2001).
2.2 Progress of an experimental session
Before entering the video laboratory, couples were reminded that decisions would be
implemented on computers (this information had already been provided in the invita-
tion mail), and they were told that they could ask for help at any point in time during
the experimental session. Couples were also informed that the session would take
place in a video laboratory and that part of the session would be video-recorded.8
6 One couple was below the required age of 30 years. Both were students aged 21–22.
7 Only the couple of students had a union duration of less than one year.
8 Couples were also told that if they did not feel like being recorded, then they could leave immediately
and that they would get a compensation of 20e per person. All couples decided to stay and take part in the
experiment.
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Finally, it was mentioned to the couples that the session would consist of several parts
(no details concerning the different parts were provided at that point of time) and that
instructions for each part would be delivered in due time.
On entering the video laboratory, couples were separated: each male entered one
of the odd numbered cabins and each female entered one of the even numbered cab-
ins.9 The experiment involved two sections. The first section was conducted with the
two spouses located in different cabins; pairs then rejoined each other for the second
section.
The first section of the experiment started with the elicitation of the participants’
socioeconomic characteristics (level of education, post-tax monthly salary, etc.). Next,
the separated subjects had to estimate their influence on the couple decision in every
day life situations. After answering this questionnaire, each subject was endowed with
40e. Finally, the separated subjects went through six investment series: in the first
three series, separated subjects had to invest part or all of their own endowment into
risky options, whereas during the last three series each subject had to invest part or
all of the couple endowment into risky options. Before going through the six series
of risky investments, subjects were told that they would have to go through 12 invest-
ment series and that each of their answers could possibly determine their payoff.10
The subjects were given details of how the payout procedures would operate only at
the end of the experiment.
In the second section of the experiment, couples made choices jointly, and this
section has been video-recorded. Male spouses were asked to join their female part-
ners in their cabin, and choices were made on the computer previously used by the
female spouse. Couples went through six investment series. They had the possibility
to discuss but no specific instructions as to how the couple decisions should be made
were provided (and no explicit time limit was given). Most couples went through the
six series of risky investments in less than 15 min, which indicates that agreements
were quite easily reached. Except for five couples, the female spouse always phys-
ically entered the couple decisions into the computer. It is rather unsurprising that
in most cases women implemented the couple decisions since the second section of
the experiment took place in the women cabins and couple decisions were made on
the same computers women used to make their individual decisions.11 Although the
9 The experimental economics video laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena com-
prises eight soundproof cabins. Each cabin provides in- and out-put for video and audio signals. In addition,
each cabin is equipped with a personal computer.
10 Payoff-relevant investments were preceded by a training series of 10 investments.
11 The likelihood that the man implements the couple decisions increases with the income difference
between the two spouses. In the five couples in which the man holds the mouse, the average income differ-
ence is 3.8 categories. The average income difference is only 1.23 categories in the 17 couples in which the
woman holds the mouse. This difference is statistically significant at the 10% level. In addition, men who
hold the mouse are on average 0.4 levels more educated than their wives, and women who hold the mouse
are on average 0.47 levels more educated than their husbands. This difference is not statistically significant
(p-value> 0.1).
123
Individual and couple decision behavior under risk 51
assignment of the mouse is not induced experimentally,12 our experimental design
clearly favors women over men for the control of the mouse.
The incentive system was as follows. In the beginning, one of the two spouses had
to randomly draw a card from a pile of five cards, one card being numbered one, two
cards being numbered two, and two cards being numbered three. If the card numbered
one was randomly drawn then the payoff-relevant decision was determined separately
for each spouse. Indeed, the payoff-relevant decision for each spouse was randomly
selected among the decisions in which the spouse invested part or all of his/her endow-
ment. The male spouse went back to his cabin, and each spouse’s paid decision was
determined according to two random draws, one random draw to determine the series
(series 1, 2, or 3) and the other random draw to determine which decision in the series.
If a card numbered two was randomly drawn, then the payoff-relevant decision for the
couple was determined. First, a random draw decided whether one of the female or
one of the male decisions to invest the couple endowment would be paid, and second,
two additional random draws were made to select the series (series 4, 5, or 6) and
the decision in the randomly selected series. If a card numbered three was randomly
drawn, then the payoff-relevant decision for the couple was determined. Two random
draws were made to select the series (series 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, or 12) and the decision in
the randomly selected series.
Our payoff scheme incentivizes subjects to truly reveal their individual preferences
in the first part of the experiment unless spouses expect their choices to be undone later
at home and/or spouses try to efficiently coordinate their choices with each other. The
first possibility is a natural consequence of the fact that our subjects have an ongoing
relationship with each other which implies that choices made during the experiment
can be undone when spouses go home. Any experimental study on intra-household
decision making suffers from this weakness, and we do not know of a satisfactory
procedure to handle it. Still, we observed that in all cases where spouses collected
money from having invested their personal endowment, earnings were placed in indi-
vidual wallets immediately after payment (in those cases, spouses were paid in private
and not informed about each other’s earnings).13 Although this evidence is not fully
convincing, it suggests the absence of binding agreements on individual earnings.
The second possibility relates to the fact that individual incentives in the first three
investment series differ, at least theoretically, from those in the next three investment
series. Spouses might choose more risky options in investment series 1, 2, and 3 than
in investment series 4, 5, and 6 as a result of coordination attempts with their part-
ner since only personal endowments are invested. It seems rather unlikely that such
coordination attempts took place. Indeed, spouses were in separate soundproof cabins
in the first section of the experiment not being aware of the decision tasks faced by
their partner. More importantly, details of how the payout procedures operate were
12 Given the nature of our subject pool, we feared that the assignment of the mouse to a specific spouse
would be a rather intrusive procedure. In a follow-up study, we investigate an alternative procedure in which
both spouses enter the couple decisions into the computer.
13 On the contrary, when spouses earnings were derived from investments of the couple endowment, one
spouse always collected the joint earnings as a result of mutual consent even though these earnings had
been divided by the experimenters into two equal shares.
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provided only at the end of the experiment. Before the start of the experiment, subjects
were only told that each of their choices could possibly determine their payoff.
The computer screens that subjects saw while going through the two sections of
the experiment have been translated (see the Supplementary Material). Additional
material of the experimental sessions, such as the written instructions and the pay-
ment procedures, is available on request from the authors. Below, we summarize our
experimental procedures.
Experimental procedures
Section 1 of the experiment: Spouses are separated
In step 1, each spouse is asked to answer questions concerning his/her personal characteristics as
well as concerning the couple characteristics. In the last three steps, each spouse goes through several
investment series. In each series, the spouse has to invest a certain amount of money either in a lottery,
modeling the toss of a fair coin, or in a sure payoff. Sure payoffs range from the low outcome of the
lottery to the high outcome of the lottery.
• Step 1. Characteristics of the individual/couple: First, each spouse is asked to answer ques-
tions concerning his/her personal characteristics (age, job status etc.). Second, each spouse is
asked to answer questions concerning his/her financial status (income, real estate etc.). Finally,
the decision-making power of each spouse in some of the couple decisions is elicited.
After answering all the questions, each spouse collects 40 e as a reward.
• Step 2. Training investment series: Each spouse goes through an investment series which is not
payoff-relevant. Each investment decision consists in investing 50 e.
• Step 3. Investment series 1, 2, and 3: Each spouse goes through three payoff-relevant investment
series. In the first series, each spouse invests 20 out of the 40 e he/she collected. In the second
and third series, each spouse invests the entire 40 e.
• Step 4. Investment series 4, 5, and 6: Each spouse goes through three payoff-relevant investment
series. In the first series, each spouse invests 40 out of the 80e the couple collected. In the second
and third series, each spouse invests the entire 80 e.
Section 2 of the experiment: Spouses are together
In step 5, the couple goes through three investment series. In each series, the couple has to invest a
certain amount of money either in a lottery, modeling the toss of a fair coin, or in a sure payoff. Sure
payoffs range from the low outcome of the lottery to the high outcome of the lottery. In step 6, the
couple goes through three investment series, including 3 questions each. In each series, the couple
has to invest a certain amount of money either in a lottery (specific to each question), modeling the
toss of a fair coin, or in a sure payoff (which does not vary within a series). In each series, the lottery
proposed in the second question depends on the answer to the first question, and the lottery proposed
in the third question depends on the answer to the first and second questions.
• Step 5. Investment series 7, 8, and 9: The couple goes through three payoff-relevant investment
series. In the first series, the couple invests 40 out of the 80e the couple collected. In the second
and third series, the couple invests the entire 80 e. The figures in series 7 (respectively 8, 9) are
exactly the same as the ones in series 4 (respectively 5, 6).
• Step 6. Investment series 10, 11, and 12: Both the amount invested and the sure payoff are
80 e. In the first series, the couple may loose half of the 80 e in the worst case and increase
their payoff up to 140 e in the best case. The expected payoff of all lotteries is 90 e, and the
variability of the payoff is increased if the couple previously selected the lottery, decreased if
they previously selected the sure payoff. The second series is similar, except that the safe payoff
is 90 e (all amounts in the first question are increased by 10 e). In the third series, there is
no risk of any loss (the payoff in the worst case is 80 e), and instead of increasing/decreasing
the variance, only one outcome is increased/decreased depending on the answer to the previous
question.
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3 Results
In this section, we first assess the decision makers’ degrees of risk aversion by rely-
ing on an ordinal approach. We restrict ourselves to the choices made by the spouses
separately in investment series 4–6 (Step 4), and to the choices made by the couples
in investment series 7–9 (Step 5). Indeed, in investment series 4 (respectively 5 and 6)
each spouse is assigned to the same lottery, and this lottery is also the one used in
investment series 7 (respectively 8 and 9) when both spouses decide jointly. There-
fore, the individual and couple answers can be compared directly. Second, we rely
on a cardinal approach, and we assume that spouses are expected utility maximizers
with a constant absolute risk aversion utility function. We use individual choices in
investment series 1–6 and joint choices in investment series 7–12 to study the evo-
lution of the balance of decision-making power within the household. Both in the
cardinal and in the ordinal approach, we allow the choices to violate the assumption
that preferences are monotonic with respect to money.
3.1 Man, woman, and couple risk attitudes
In each investment series j , the decision maker faces 11 choices (i = 1, . . . , 11)
between a lottery L j and a sure payoff S j (i). The lottery yields the low payoff S j (11)
and the high payoff S j (1) with equal probabilities. The sequence of sure payoffs is




S j (1) − S j (11)
)
, i = 1, . . . , 11. As the expected
value of the lottery equals S j (6), a risk-neutral decision maker is indifferent between
the lottery and S j (6).
The set of choices made by a decision maker facing investment series j is inconsis-
tent if monotonic and transitive preferences cannot rationalize those choices. Table 1
shows, for each investment series, the relative frequency of inconsistent sets of choices
for women, men, and couples. Altogether, there were 23% (respectively 13 and 9%) of
inconsistent sets of choices for women (respectively for men and for couples). Most of
the women inconsistent sets of choices were made in the early investment series, which
suggests that women need more than one training investment series to get acquainted
with the task.14
A consistent set of choices is characterized by a unique switching point, i ∈
{0, . . . , 11}: for a given investment series j , decision maker k in class i prefers
lottery L j to all deterministic amounts lower than or equal to S j (i + 1) and pre-
fers all amounts larger than or equal to S j (i) to lottery L j . In this case, we denote
by k the risk preference relation of decision maker k, uniquely defined on the set
14 Given the nature of our risk elicitation mechanism and subject pool, the amount of inconsistencies
observed is rather low. Experimental studies which have employed a multiple price list (MPL) risk elici-
tation mechanism report a proportion of inconsistent preferences usually larger than 10%. Among others,
both Eckel and Wilson (2004) and Holt and Laury (2002) report 13% of inconsistent preferences (this
proportion drops to 5.5% when payoffs are scaled by a factor of 50 or 90 in the latter study), and Bruner
et al. (2008) report 20% of inconsistent preferences. Note that these studies used college students as exper-
imental subjects (who are generally quick on understanding their task in the experiment) and that the MPL
mechanism allows subjects to see all choices in one frame which might lead them to make more consistent
choices than they would otherwise (but seems to induce a framing effect).
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Table 1 Relative frequencies of
inconsistent series of choice Investment series Woman Man Couple
1 (Woman and Man) 9/22 2/22
2 (Woman and Man) 7/22 3/22
3 (Woman and Man) 6/22 3/22
4 (Woman and Man)/7 (Couple) 2/22 3/22 2/22
5 (Woman and Man)/8 (Couple) 2/22 2/22 1/22
6 (Woman and Man)/9 (Couple) 4/22 4/22 3/22
Table 2 The 12 sets of consistent choices
Switching point Set of consistent choices Investment series: Woman, Man; Couple
1 2 3 4; 7 5; 8 6; 9
0 L j k S j (1) 1, 0
1 S j (1) k L j k S j (2)
2 S j (2) k L j k S j (3)
3 S j (3) k L j k S j (4) 1, 1
4 S j (4) k L j k S j (5) 0, 1 0, 1 0, 1 1, 0; 0 1, 0; 0
5 S j (5) k L j k S j (6) 0, 3 1, 2 5, 1 1, 1; 2 1, 1; 2 0, 0; 1
6 S j (6) k L j k S j (7) 5, 7 1, 3 6, 8 4, 7; 6 4, 6; 2 6, 7; 5
7 S j (7) k L j k S j (8) 1, 0 2, 6 1, 3 4, 5; 4 5, 3; 0 4, 3; 4
8 S j (8) k L j k S j (9) 3, 5 5, 3 1, 4 5, 2; 7 2, 6; 13 3, 4; 5
9 S j (9) k L j k S j (10) 2, 3 0, 1 2, 2; 1 2, 2; 4 0, 1; 4
10 S j (10) k L j k S j (11) 1, 0 2, 0 1, 1 0, 1; 0 2, 1; 0 1, 1; 0
11 S j (11) k L j
(
L j − OR
)
1, 3 2, 1 2, 0 3, 1; 0 3, 1; 0 4, 2; 0
{L j , S j (i), i = 1, . . . , 11} by his/her set of replies to series j . More specifically,
S j (i) k L j means that decision maker k prefers the sure payoff S j (i) to the lottery
L j . Given the construction of the series, the classes are ranked by increasing risk
aversion, which defines an ordinal measure of risk aversion.
Out of the 211 potential sets of choices in a given investment series, only 12 are
consistent, which defines 12 ordered classes of risk aversion. They are represented in
Table 2, together with the frequencies of observed answers in each series, for women,
men, and couples.
We observe that a significant proportion of individuals (especially women) are will-
ing to receive always less money just for the benefit of avoiding any risk (15 out of
22∗6 women-series and 8 out of 22×6 men-series). We denote by Locally Opposed to
Risk for lottery L j (L j−OR), those decision makers who consistently prefer any sure
payoff S j (i), i = 1, . . . , 11, to lottery L j in investment series j.L j−OR preferences
are never shared by both spouses in a couple nor by the two spouses together, i.e.,
no L j−OR individual was able to convince his/her spouse. We observe that only one
respondent (a female respondent) is L j−OR for the six series L j , j = 1, . . . , 6 which
implies an infinite level of risk aversion.
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Number of safe choices
Man, series 3
Fig. 1 Empirical distributions of safe choices, individual money
In order to take into account inconsistent sets of choices, the total number of “safe”
choices is used as an indicator of risk aversion: for a given investment series, the mea-
sure of risk aversion is given by the frequency of choices where the decision maker
picks the sure payoff instead of the lottery (in case of consistent series, the same
measure is obtained with the switching point). Figure 1 shows the empirical distribu-
tions of safe choices in the three investment series concerned with individual money,
separately for women and men. Both for women and men, the distribution is more
spread for the first series, and some respondents appear extremely risk lovers. This
may reflect the fact that one training series was not enough and that some respondents
answered randomly in the first series because they were not acquainted with the task.
Figure 2 shows the empirical distributions of safe choices in the three investment
series concerned with couple money, separately for women, men, and couples (spouses
together). In all three investment series, the distribution of couple choices is more con-
centrated than the distribution of spouse choices.
Both figures suggest that women are slightly more risk averse than men, and that
men and women answers are more heterogeneous than couples answers. This is con-
firmed in Table 3, which shows the average frequencies of safe choices for the woman,
the man and for the couple in the different investment series, as well as their differ-
ences.
Concerning investment series 1–3 (individual money), women and men answers
cannot be directly compared since the amounts involved were generated randomly,
independently for the woman and for the man. Table 3 supports the idea that indi-
viduals (especially women) answered more randomly in series 1, since the average
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Fig. 2 Empirical distributions of safe choices, couple money
Table 3 Average frequencies of safe choices (standard deviations in parentheses)
Investment series Woman Man Couple Differences
Woman–Couple Man–Couple Woman–Man
1 6.27 (2.57) 6.73 (2.18) −0.50 (3.69)
2 8.23 (1.60) 7.36 (1.68) 0.86 (2.57)
3 6.59 (1.89) 6.77 (1.60) −0.18 (2.34)
4/7 7.50 (1.87) 7.36 (1.53) 6.95 (1.09) 0.55 (1.84) 0.41 (1.37) 0.14 (2.28)
5/8 7.86 (2.03) 7.59 (1.53) 7.73 (1.16) 0.14 (2.21) −0.14 (1.49) 0.27 (2.86)
6/9 7.45 (2.06) 7.36 (1.89) 7.27 (1.20) 0.18 (1.92) 0.09 (2.14) 0.09 (3.00)
frequency of safe choices is lower15 and the standard deviations (of individual answers
and of their differences) are larger for series 1 than for series 2 and 3.
Concerning investment series 4–6 (couple money), women are (slightly) more risk
averse than men.16 Moreover, the average couple tends to be less risk averse than its
15 The average would be 5.5 for pure random choices, which is lower than the observed average of 7–8 for
the other series.
16 Individual answers in investment series 4, 5, and 6 could reflect more the preferences of the couple
than individual answers in investment series 1, 2, and 3 since individuals invest the couple’s money. Our
experimental data do not support this argument. Indeed, the correlation factor between the average degree of
risk aversion in Step 3 and the average degree of risk aversion in Step 4 is highly positive for both spouses:
It equals 0.682 for the woman and 0.574 for the man. These correlation factors are at least as positive as
those obtained when comparing the average degrees of risk aversion of different investment series in the
same step for a given spouse: In Step 3, the average correlation factor equals 0.419 for the woman and
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average members (Munro et al. 2008 report a similar finding). Indeed, the average
measure of risk aversion for couples is systematically lower than the average measure
of risk aversion for women, and it is lower than the average measure of risk aver-
sion for men in two out of the three investment series. The variance of the difference
between men and women measures of risk aversion increases over time. The variance
of the difference between the couples and the men measures of risk aversion also
increases over time contrary to the variance of the difference between the couples and
the women measures of risk aversion which exhibits no monotonic pattern. In conclu-
sion, after controlling for the average difference between women, men, and couples
measures of risk aversion, the distance between couples and men measures of risk
aversion increases, whereas the distance between couples and women measures of
risk aversion remains constant. This suggests that the relative decision-making power
of the woman when the couple is facing a unique decision increases over time.
In the next section, we study the evolution of the balance of power within the
household, and we relate our findings to the empirical/theoretical literature on intra-
household decision-making.
3.2 The balance of power within the household
We now assume that the preferences of any decision maker in our sample can be
represented by a utility function with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) for
money x > 0 (this choice is based on initial tests for various standard utility func-
tions). Decision maker k’s utility function is, therefore, given by Vk(x) = V (x; θk) =
(1 − exp(−θk x)) /θk where θk is the level of absolute risk aversion. In investment
series j , the utility of the safe alternative S j (i) is Vk(S j (i)), while the expected utility





)] = (Vk(S j (1)) + Vk(S j (11))
)
/2.
Experimental evidence suggests that stochastic variation is an essential feature
of decision-making behavior.17 Therefore, we assume that choices made by decision
maker k in series j are consistent with an absolute risk aversion level θ˜ jk , a random var-
iable modeled as θ˜ jk = a+μk +δ j +ε jk where a is a constant term equal across series
and decision makers, μk is an decision-maker-specific term with zero mean, δ j mea-
sures potential systematic deviations specific to series j and ε jk is a normal error term
with zero mean and variance specific to series j . The variance of μk + ε jk is denoted
by σ 2j . We employ an interval regression method to estimate the absolute risk aversion
Footnote 16 continued
0.288 for the man; In Step 4, the average correlation factor equals 0.718 for the woman and 0.467 for the
man. On the contrary, correlation factors between the average degree of risk aversion of the woman and
the average degree of risk aversion of the man are either weakly positive or negative depending on the
considered step(s): In Step 3 (respectively Step 4), the correlation factor between the average degrees of
risk aversion of the two spouses equals −0.125 (respectively −0.148); The correlation factor between the
average degree of risk aversion of the woman in Step 3 and the average degree of risk aversion of the man
in Step 4 equals –0.046; The correlation factor between the average degree of risk aversion of the woman
in Step 4 and the average degree of risk aversion of the man in Step 3 equals 0.118.
17 In controlled experiments in which subjects have confronted exactly the same choice problem on two
occasions, the proportion of choice reversals is between 10 and 30%. See Table 1 in Stott (2006, p. 105).
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Table 4 Regression of the couple CARA level on the individual weighted average CARA levels
Series Case 1 (22 couples) Case 2 (17 couples)
Woman Man Joint Woman=UC Man=No UC Joint
7 0.13 (0.14) 0.20 (0.12) 3.77 (0.15) 0.22 (0.11) 0.19 (0.16) 4.32 (0.11)
8 0.03 (0.55) 0.25 (0.00) 8.41 (0.02) 0.07 (0.34) 0.24 (0.01) 8.52 (0.02)
9 0.24 (0.02) 0.40 (0.02) 8.94 (0.02) 0.34∗ (0.06) 0.35∗ (0.06) 6.69 (0.04)
10 0.34 (0.02) 0.56 (0.02) 8.10 (0.02) 0.93 (0.00) 0.32∗ (0.08) 18.06 (0.00)
11 0.27 (0.05) 0.21 (0.31) 4.16 (0.13) 0.66 (0.00) 0.01 (0.97) 12.11 (0.00)
12 0.11 (0.16) 0.14 (0.26) 2.72 (0.26) 0.24 (0.05) 0.07 (0.63) 3.86 (0.15)
Notes: ,, ∗ indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively
Two-sided p-values in parentheses
levels. With a normal distribution, we obtain an unbiased estimate θˆ jk of θ˜ jk which, in
turn, enables us to compute an unbiased estimate of θk . Average individual risk aver-
sion levels are based on the weighted mean of the absolute risk aversions estimated for
each of the first six investment series: θˆk = ∑6j=1
((











The weights, inversely proportional to the estimated standard deviation of the resid-
uals, improve the efficiency of the estimate when the variance of the residuals varies
across series.
In order to study the evolution of the balance of power within the household, we
use the individual risk aversions estimated from choices made in the first section of
the experiment to explain the couple risk aversions estimated from choices made in
the second section of the experiment. Concretely, we regress the couple CARA level
on the respective spouses weighted average CARA levels for the different investment
series of the second section of the experiment. Regressions are conducted on the entire
sample (Case 1) and on the restricted sample composed of couples in which women
ultimately implemented the joint decisions (Case 2). Our regression results, for each
investment series of the second section of the experiment, are displayed in Table 4
where, in columns “Joint,” we report the χ2-statistic of the likelihood test for the null
hypothesis that both coefficients are zero.18
According to the regression results for Case 1, neither the man nor the woman
weighted average CARA level significantly influences the couple CARA level in the
seventh investment series. This observation suggests that spouses needed to acquire
some experience in making investment choices jointly. The influence of the man risk
aversion on the couple risk aversion is highly significant in investment series 8, it
becomes significant in investment series 9 and 10, and it is non-significant in the last
two investment series. On the contrary, the influence of the woman risk aversion on
the couple risk aversion is not significant in investment series 8, but it is significant
in investment series 9, 10, and 11. These observations indicate that women gain more
and more power over the course of decision making to the detriment of men.
18 In the Table 4, we report separate regressions for the different investment series. Running a single regres-
sion on the pooled data with interaction terms between investment series and individual measures of risk
aversion produces qualitatively equivalent results.
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The balance of power within the household evolves even more clearly in couples
where women ultimately implement the joint decisions. According to the regression
results for Case 3, the influence of the man risk aversion on the couple risk aver-
sion is highly significant in investment series 8, it becomes weakly significant in
investment series 9 and 10, and it is non-significant in the last two investment series.
On the contrary, the influence of the woman risk aversion on the couple risk aversion
is not significant in investment series 8, it is weakly significant in investment series 9,
it becomes highly significant in investment series 10 and 11, and it is still significant in
the last investment series. In addition, the marginal impact of the woman risk aversion
is identical to the marginal impact of the man risk aversion in investment series 9
(where both are weakly significant), but it is three times higher in investment series
10 (where the man risk aversion is weakly significant, and the woman risk aversion is
highly significant). Finally, the marginal impact of the woman risk aversion decreases
in the last two investment series (where the man risk aversion is not significant).19
Our estimation results suggest that in most couples men have, initially, a stronger
decision-making power than women. This observation is in line with earlier stud-
ies which show that men tend to have more say in economic decision making and
readier access to financial resources than their wives (e.g., Pahl 1995; Kirchler et al.
2001). More surprisingly, our estimation results also suggest that, far from being fixed,
decision-making powers are malleable. Women who ultimately implement the joint
decisions gain more and more decision-making power over the course of an experi-
mental session.20 Our evidence on the malleability of the balance of power within the
household is clearly at odds with the collective approach based on static models of
intra-household resource allocation that obeys a Pareto-efficient sharing rule. How-
ever, recent extensions of the collective approach to intertemporal settings where the
assumption of intra-household commitment is relaxed allow for temporal variations in
relative decision-making power (see, e.g., Mazzocco 2007). In a more drastic depar-
ture from the early collective approach, Basu (2006) discusses a model of household
behavior under no-commitment where Pareto weights depend on choices variables.
As a consequence, the Pareto weight assigned to each spouse is endogenous to the
household decision-making process, i.e., the household balance of power is endog-
enously determined. The assumption of an endogenous intra-household balance of
power has received empirical support by Lancaster et al. (2006) whose findings using
household-level unit record data sets from India indicate that decision-making powers
are determined jointly with the expenditure outcomes.
Although these recent extensions of the collective approach assume that
intra-household allocations influence the balance of power within the household, they
are not fully consistent with our experimental results since they predict that house-
19 Regression of the couple safe choices on the individual safe choices leads to similar results for the subset
of investment series where the couple and individual choices can be directly compared. See Table 6 in the
Appendix.
20 Note that we do not argue that women gain more decision-making power only because they ultimately
implement the joint decisions, as it could well be that women ultimately implement the joint decisions
because they initially have substantial decision-making power. We do, however, believe that there is a
relative gain in decision-making power obtained by the spouse who ultimately implements the couple
decisions.
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hold decisions shape relative decision-making power gradually. On the contrary, we
observe that power patterns within the household vary quickly, which suggests that
the household decision process heavily depends on the context. This observation
might cause discomfort to economists, but it is fully in line with the social-exchange
formulation of family power dynamics in social psychology and recent evidence from
the marketing literature. According to the social-exchange perspective, decision-mak-
ing power resides in the characteristics of relationships and not in personal traits which
implies that power patterns within families will vary from time to time and with task
characteristics (Beckman-Brindley and Tavormina 1978). Su et al. (2003) examine
the dynamics of spousal behavioral interactions in a questionnaire study based on a
sequence of family purchase decisions. Their results suggest that spousal purchase–
decision processes are adaptive. In early purchase episodes, few spouses are willing
to yield when faced with coercion while, in later purchase episodes, spouses get their
way by strong means of influence. The authors speculate that there is a learning curve
underlying the spousal decision–behavior dynamics.
Before concluding, we provide in the next section a quantitative analysis of the
couples discussions which corroborates our previous analyzes of the choice data.21
4 Quantitative analysis of the discussions within the couple
In this section, we present a basic quantitative analysis of the discussions that couples
had while answering investment series 7–12 (a content analysis is beyond the scope of
the present study). Two undergraduate native raters independently watched the videos
of 17 couples several times and evaluated the talk duration of each spouse, i.e., the
amount of time spent by each spouse talking to the other spouse about which joint
decision to implement.22 Both raters were instructed to exclude from talk duration
the amount of time spent by each spouse discussing topics not closely related to the
experiment. Table 5 shows the individual talk durations per investment series as well
as the ratio between the woman talk duration (WTD) and the couple talk duration
(CTD) for each of the 17 couples.
In all these couples except two, the man was always arguing more about which joint
decision to implement than the woman. Unsurprisingly, both spouses talk on average
more in the seventh investment series than in the latter investment series. Although
there is no clear time trend in WTDs, men argue on average more in the first three
investment series than in the last three investments series. It seems natural to relate the
talk duration of an individual with his/her decision-making power: the more an indi-
vidual is arguing the more he/she is trying to influence the joint decision (and, in most
cases, he/she will probably be successful). In this respect, our quantitative analysis
of the couples discussions corroborates our statistical analyzes of the choice data: the
man leads the joint decision, at least initially. Our previous analyzes also suggested
that the woman who ultimately implements the joint decisions gains power over the
21 Verbal frequency measures constitute the main quantitative process measures to study family interactions
in psychology. See, e.g., Jacob (1975) and the references therein.
22 Unfortunately, five out of the 22 videos had to be discarded due to the low sound quality.
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Table 5 Individual talk durations in seconds
Session Cabin Spouse Investment series Total WTD/CTD
7 8 9 10 11 12
January 24, 2005 1 Man 45 40 28 35 43 25 216 0.388
7 pm Woman 35 30 20 10 23 19 137
January 24, 2005 2 Man 55 60 60 34 38 23 270 0.338
7 pm Woman 40 25 18 15 29 11 138
January 25, 2005 1 Man 29 19 11 10 24 25 118 0.433
7 pm Woman 20 13 12 6 24 15 90
January 25, 2005 2 Man 44 33 50 27 37 12 203 0.450
7 pm Woman 23 18 49 17 44 15 166
January 25, 2005 3 Man 44 38 36 14 20 37 189 0.357
7 pm Woman 20 14 11 6 20 34 105
January 25, 2005 4 Man 8 18 26 17 28 8 105 0.521
7 pm Woman 16 14 17 23 28 16 114
January 26, 2005 1 Man 25 20 22 30 31 36 164 0.416
7 pm Woman 20 9 21 20 21 26 117
January 26, 2005 2 Man 52 13 29 30 20 8 152 0.290
7 pm Woman 26 8 5 6 11 6 62
January 26, 2005 3 Man 4 3 7 3 31 17 65 0.356
7 pm Woman 3 8 4 4 6 11 36
January 27, 2005 2 Man 13 9 11 14 21 10 78 0.447
7 pm Woman 13 7 7 9 14 13 63
January 27, 2005 3 Man 70 51 42 43 34 28 268 0.396
7 pm Woman 46 25 14 32 42 17 176
January 28, 2005 1 Man 51 44 21 19 19 31 185 0.387
7 pm Woman 26 19 24 15 18 15 117
January 28, 2005 2 Man 24 34 25 24 34 25 166 0.362
7 pm Woman 24 6 17 23 11 13 94
February 19, 2005 1 Man 38 11 13 16 20 29 127 0.392
3 pm Woman 24 8 10 12 9 19 82
February 19, 2005 2 Man 48 30 22 30 30 35 195 0.449
3 pm Woman 36 34 18 27 19 25 159
February 19, 2005 3 Man 42 20 8 3 6 10 89 0.429
3 pm Woman 20 7 11 8 5 16 67
February 19, 2005 2 Man 20 18 10 6 28 20 102 0.512
5 pm Woman 23 16 12 7 34 15 107
Note: WTD/CTD denotes the ratio between the woman talk duration and the couple talk duration
course of decision making to the detriment of the man. We offer now a final evaluation
of the impact of ultimate control on the evolution of power balance by comparing the
woman relative talk duration when she has ultimate control to her relative talk duration
when the man has ultimate control. Figure 3 shows the woman relative talk duration
in each investment series averaged, on the one hand, over the 13 couples where the
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Fig. 3 Woman relative talk duration
woman had ultimate control and averaged, on the other hand, over the 4 couples where
the man had ultimate control.
In the seventh investment series, whether the woman has ultimate control or not
does not influence her talk duration. However, in investment series 8 and 9, a woman
without ultimate control argues, in relative terms, much more than a woman who has
ultimate control. A similar tendency is observed in the last part of the experimental
session, i.e., in investment series 10–12. Under the natural assumption that talk dura-
tion is related to decision-making power, we again conclude that the spouse who has
ultimate control gains additional influence on the decision of the couple.
5 Concluding comments
This article reports results on individual and couple choices in an experiment involv-
ing risk. Individuals and couples make binary choices between a lottery and a sure
payoff. In the first part of the experiment, spouses are separated and choose inde-
pendently. Individual choices express individual risk preferences. In the second part
of the experiment, male spouses rejoin their partner, and they make joint choices. In
most cases, the woman implemented the couple choices which express collective risk
preferences. We investigate the evolution of the balance of power within the household
by the individual risk aversions estimated from choices made in the first section of
the experiment to explain the couple risk aversions estimated from choices made in
the second section of the experiment. We find that the man is initially more successful
than the woman in influencing couple choices but that the woman progressively gains
power over the course of decision making, and we speculate that part of this power
increase relates to the ultimate control over the implementation of joint choices.
Our evidence on the dynamics of power balance suggests that actual decision pro-
cesses within the household are adaptive and depend on the context. This finding
contradicts the early collective approach based on static models of intra-household
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resource allocation according to which the decision-making powers are regarded as
exogenous to the household decision-making process. It is, however, compatible with
recent extensions of the collective approach, which assume that intra-household allo-
cations influence the balance of power within the household. More research on larger
samples would be necessary to validate this preliminary finding. Similarly, larger
samples would be necessary to link stated and revealed decision-making power to
distribution factors (such as difference between spouses, educational levels, ages, or
assets).
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Appendix: Dynamics of power balance in the ordinal approach
Contrary to the regression results reported in Table 4, the regression results reported
in the table below are based on a subset of the observed choices, namely the individ-
ual choices made in investment series 4–6 (Step 4) and the couple choices made in
investment series 7–9 (Step 5).
Table 6 Regression of couple safe choices on individual safe choices
Series Case 1 (22 couples) Case 2 (17 couples)
Woman Man Adjusted R2 Woman=UC Man=No UC Adjusted R2
7 0.15 (0.19) 0.33 (0.03) 0.24 0.25 (0.12) 0.34 (0.03) 0.36
8 0.15 (0.23) 0.37 (0.03) 0.15 0.38 (0.01) 0.41 (0.01) 0.50
9 0.25 (0.05) 0.11 (0.43) 0.11 0.29∗ (0.10) 0.07 (0.70) 0.07
Notes: ,, ∗ indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively
Two-sided p-values in parentheses
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